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FULL ELECTRIC UTILITY OWNERSHIP
OF PURPA QUALIFYING
COGENERATION FACILITIES: TROUBLE
DOWN THE LINE?
CHARLES A. TIEVSKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
American industry wastes tremendous amounts of energy annually
as a result of its inefficient use of process heat.' In order to utilize this
waste heat, Congress enacted section 210 of the Public Utilities Regu-
latory Policies Act of 19782 (PURPA). Section 210 provides incen-
tives for industry to engage in cogeneration-the sequential
production of thermal and electric energy.3 PURPA establishes a
* A.B., Washington University, 1981; J.D., Washington University, 1984.
1. Process heat is the thermal energy expended by industry in its manufacturing
operations. Examples of process heat include kinetic energy expended in smelting
ore, driving a turbine, or rolling steel. Industry as a whole wastes an estimated one-
half of all heat it produces, both in the United States and worldwide. M. CHIOGIOn,
INDUSTRIAL ENERGY CONSERVATION 22 (1979). The waste heat is dissipated into the
earth, water, or atmosphere during manufacturing or other processes. Id
Individual industries vary in their effective use of manufactured heat. On a scale
where efficiency is measured by the capabilities of currently operating equipment
(first law of thermodynamics test), the chemical industry utilizes 50% of available
heat; electric power production, 30%; the steel industry, 25%; garbage incineration,
17%; and copper smelting, 12%. Id at 27.
2. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982). Congress sought to develop certain types of energy
efficiency technologies and alternative energy fuel sources as means to generate elec-
tricity. Waste heat was only one of the sources promoted.
3. Id In addition, § 210 promotes a number of alternative energy technologies
designated "small power production" facilities as well as geothermal power produc-
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framework by which individual entrepreneurs4 may engage in
cogeneration without coming within the jurisdiction of state' and fed-
tion. Id § 824a-3 (a). These include facilities fueled by biomass, waste, renewable
resources, geothermal resources, or a combination of these fuels. Id § 796(17)(A)(i).
The facilities may not be larger than 80 megawatts (mw) capacity. 'Id
§ 796(17)(A)(ii). These facilities fall into four categories: 1) solar (radiant energy
from the sun used to create electricity with photovoltaic cells), see Costello & Rap-
paport, The Technical and Economic Development of Photovoltaics, 5 ANN. REV. EN-
ERGY 336 (1980); 2) wind (wind drives propellers turning a generator), see Oppendahl
& Tarduno, Wind Energy Conversion, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 431 (1981); 3) low
head hydro (small dams or natural streams turning generator), see Erskine, A Future
for Hydropower: Small Dams, Non-Dams, ENV'T 33-38 (Mar. 1978); and 4) geother-
mal (ground heat used to produce steam that turns a generator), see Note, Geothermal
Resources for the Small Developer, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 241 (1977).
4. Persons applying to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for
registration as a qualifying cogenerating facility (QCF) are a highly diverse group. In
addition to large industrialists and energy corporations are a number of individuals
engaging in what can best be described as "sparking," i.e., operating tiny generating
systems and selling the output to the local electric company. See, e.g., Charles
Krivanek, 23 F.E.R.C. 62,062 (1983) (10 kw wind power); Justin W. Whitney, 21
F.E.R.C. 1 62,040 (1982) (five kw wind power); Summer House Inn, 20 F.E.R.C.
62,450 (1982) (100 kw cogeneration).
5. An industry that has committed its private property to the servite of the public
may be regulated by government in order to ensure the public's receipt of service.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), is a frequently cited case that confirmed the
constitutionality of Illinois' regulations of grain elevators in Chicago. Although both
natural monopolies (e.g., municipal sewer system) and competitive industries (e.g.,
private trucking companies) are regulated, there is growing dissatisfaction with eco-
nomic regulation of business expressed by both the regulators and the regulated. See
Strauss, Regulatory Analysis and Judicial Review, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 627 (1981). There
is still a case to be made against deregulation, and persons in some regulated indus-
tries are strongly opposed to deregulation. See Dowd and Burton, Deregulation is not
an Answerfor Electric Utilities, I10 PuB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 16, 1982, at 21. But ef.
Berry, The Casefor Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, 110 PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Sept. 16, 1982, at 13.
The history of the regulation of electricity industries is cyclical: there are calls for
regulation, intermittent industry dissatisfaction, and then calls for deregulation.
Early commercial generation and distribution of power was an area left wide open to
private enterprise, and in some parts of the country areas as small as one square block
were made service areas for a given utility company by a municipal authority. See R.
HELLMAN, GOVERNMENT COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 9
(1972). Local government soon realized that more efficient power supply systems
than could be effectuated through competition were necessary, and cries for official
intervention arose from both ratepayer and supplier. Id at 10. The latter were par-
ticularly vociferous as they saw each other swallowed up by larger competitors.
The basic form of electric utility regulation is public or private ownership of gener-
ating and distributing facilities monitored by state public utilities commissions. The
commissions are responsible for setting allowable rates of return, hearing disputes
between the utility and the ratepayer, guaranteeing proper foresight in planning, and
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eral6 electric utility regulations. Although PURPA has caused hun-
dreds of persons to engage in deregulated generation,7 the overall
success of the plan has been limited: substantial available cogenera-
tion capacity remains untapped with no sign of utilization.' This lack
of development may be blamed partly on the express exclusion of
assuring both the utilities and the public that each will be treated fairly. See generaly
1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 25-44, 227-84 (1969). If an
electric company normally does not sell to the public as would a non-profit coopera-
tive supplying electric service only to members, it will not be under the jurisdiction of
many state utility commissions. See, e.g., Inland Empire Rural Electrification v. De-
partment of Pub. Works, 199 Wash. 527, 92 P.2d 258 (1939). The utility is then self-
regulating.
6. Electric utilities are regulated by the FERC pursuant to its authority under the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1982). Owners of electric utilities are
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1982).
The Federal Power Act establishes regulation of the wholesale sale of electric
power, and it governs wholesale rates (§ 824e), accounting procedures (§ 825), inter-
connection of utility grids (§ 824a), and many other facets of utility operation.
As a major piece of New Deal legislation, PUHCA marked the end of unregulated
ownership of controlling blocks of utility shares. The Federal Trade Commission had
researched abuses by electric utility holding companies and found that many compa-
nies: I) Had issued shares based on paper assets; 2) had extracted unconscionable
profits from subsidiaries; 3) were able to control subsidiaries with inordinately low
investments; and 4) generally did not take the best interests of the subsidiary into
account. 2 A. PRIEST, supra note 5, at 507. Because the public need for reliable
electric power is highly compelling, Congress required the utilities to register detailed
organizational and financial information with the SEC, and disallowed transactions
of company shares without SEC approval. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79e-g (1982). Mergers and
acquisitions now must be approved by the Commission. Id § 790). There are a
number of other technical regulations. See generally 2 A. PRIEST, supra note 5, at
511-22. Presently, there is a movement to modify drastically or repeal PUHCA. See
The Movement to Revise the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 112 PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Dec. 8, 1983, at 39; Hawes, Public Utility Holding CompanyAct of1935-Fossil
or Foil?, 30 VAND. L. Rv. 605 (1977).
7. By January 1, 1984, the FERC had certified approximately 430 qualifying
cogeneration and small power production facilities pursuant to rules providing for
optional certification. 18 C.F.R. § 292.207 (1984). Of that figure, 162 are cogenerat-
ing facilities.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 134-36. One study estimates that industry
will develop between 6,200 mw and 12,800 mw of cogenerated power by the year
1990. RESOURCE PLANNING ASSOCIATES, THE POTENTIAL FOR INDUSTRIAL
COGENERATION BY 1'990, July 31, 1981, cited in Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act
Amendments: Hearings on S. 1885 and S.1966 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Regula-
tion of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Comm, part 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
79 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Senate Amendments]. That compares unfavorably with
estimates of 1985 cogeneration potential of up to 267,000 mw. Williams, Industrial
Cogeneration, 3 ANN. REV. ENERGY 313, 331 (1978).
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electric utilities from full ownership of qualifying cogeneration facili-
ties (QCF)9 because many potential cogenerators have neither the ex-
pertise nor the capital to engage in QCF development.' 0 Presently,
electric utilities may own no more than fifty percent of a QCF either
directly or through a subsidiary."
One method of realizing greater benefit from cogeneration would
be to permit electric utilities to wholly own QCFs through PURPA
amendment.' 2 This Note examines the major issues presented by full
utility 13 ownership of QCFs. It analyzes the statutory scheme regard-
ing ownership requirements and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC)I4 rules promulgated thereunder. The Note
then turns to the potential benefits of such regulatory change, and
any detrimental manifestations that might occur. Finally, the Note
makes recommendations for suggested change.
II. COGENERATION TECHNOLOGY
The simultaneous production of electricity and some other form of
9. The statute prohibits a person primarily engaged in the sale or production of
electric power from owning a qualifying facility. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17)(C)(ii),
(18)(B)(ii) (1982). Under the FERC rules an electric utility may own no more than
50% of a qualifying facility. 18 C.F.R. § 292.206(b) (1984). See infra notes 76-97 and
accompanying text.
10. Capital and operating costs of even small cogenerators can be prohibitive.
Furthermore, expertise in power generation and distribution is limited to the regu-
lated sector. See infra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
11. 18 C.F.R. § 292.206(b) (1984).
12. Some interested parties believe that the statute does not prohibit full electric
utility ownership of QCFs, and that it is within the power of the FERC to bring about
a change through rulemaking. Senate Amendments, supra note 8, at 30 (statement of
Hon. C.M. Butler, Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); id at 297
(letter from Frederick L. Weber, Executive Vice President, Edison Electric Institute,
to Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey, May 21, 1982); id at 308 (letter from Rita A. Barmann,
Director of Congressional Relations, National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners, to Marilyn Burkhardt, Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Energy
Regulation, May 3, 1982).
13. For the purposes of this Note, the word "utility" when used alone is to mean
"electric utility" unless otherwise noted.
14. The FERC, along with the Department of Energy, is successor to the Federal
Power Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1982). The jurisdiction extends to oversight of
hydroelectric works, generation and transmission of electric power, rates and trans-
port charges for natural gas, regulation of mergers under the Federal Power Act and
the Natural Gas Act, and regulations of oil pipeline transport charges. Id The Com-
mission is empowered to make rules and adjudicate disputes, and it exercises both
powers broadly. Id §§ 7172(f)-(g).
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usable energy (cogeneration), once widely practiced by industry,15
was abandoned until recently.' 6 By using the same combustion for
two separate processes, a cogenerator can achieve maximum fuel effi-
ciency.' 7 Thus, a cogenerator can produce electricity and a thermal
by-product and use little more than the same amount of fuel neces-
sary to produce either type of energy independently.' 8
There are two types of cogenerators-topping and bottoming. The
topping cogenerator is a system in which fuel is burned in the pro-
duction of electricity, and the exhaust is harnessed for a secondary
use.' 9 For example, in a factory that produces power by operating
15. Industrial cogeneration dates to the 1880s in both Europe and the United
States. The need at the time was based in the undeveloped and unreliable condition
of electric utilities. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INDUSTRIAL AND COM-
MERCIAL COGENERATION 3 (1983) (Pub. No. OTA-E-192) [hereinafter cited as OTA].
16. In 1902, of the 2,000 mw capacity on line nationwide, 59.4% were industrial
generation, although not necessarily cogeneration. By 1980, total on line capacity was
approximately 600,000 mw, of which approximately 2.7%, or 16.2 mw, was of indus-
trial origin. Id at 4.
17. A small cogenerator manufactured by the Fiat Corporation and intended for
residential use realizes 90% fuel efficiency as compared with 30% for conventional
power plants and 60-65% for conventional boilers. Cogeneration: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Energy Development and Applications of the Comm. on Science and
Technology, 96th Cong., 2d Ses. 196 (1980) (testimony of Eduardo Bassignana, Di-
rector, Fiat Auto S.P.A/TOTEM). As measured by the second law of thermodynam-
ics ("the ratio of the least amount of energy that could have accomplished a specific
task ... to the amount of energy actually required to perform that task"), cogenera-
tion is 44% fuel efficient when compared with electric production (33%), steel produc-
tion (23%) and petroleum production (9%). N. DEAN, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN
INDUSTRY 5 (1980). Presumably, if those lower efficiency processes engaged in
cogeneration, they would realize considerably greater benefit from their energy
dollar.
18. For example, a conventional electric generator produces 600 kilowatt-hours
(kwh) of power from one barrel of oil. A conventional steam boiler can produce
8,500 lbs. of process steam from 2 1/4 barrels of oil. A cogeneration system can pro-
duce 600 kwh of power and 8,500 lbs. of steam for 2 3/4 barrels of oil. There is thus a
net savings of one-half a barrel of oil over separate production of power and steam.
OTA, supra note 15, at 7.
19. There are several commercial topping technologies currently available. The
most common technology is steam turbine topping, consisting of a boiler, turbine, and
generator. Fuel is burned, which boils water into high pressure steam. The steam
drives the turbine, which in turn is connected to a generator, which produces power.
The steam exits the turbine at a reduced pressure and temperature, where it is suited
for space heating or industrial processes requiring low pressure steam, such as chemi-
cal and paper manufacturing. Id at 122. Steam stopping is the oldest form of
cogeneration, and also has the least potential for energy savings. N. DEAN, supra note
17, at 135. It is, however, one of the easiest to adapt to coal fuel. Id
Open-cycle combustion turbines are similar to steam turbines, but unlike steam
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coal-fired boilers to produce steam for driving a turbine, the factory
could use the exhaust steam for purposes such as space heating, in-
dustrial process, or for sale.2" Some electric utilities have engaged
extensively in topping cogeneration for many years.2
A bottoming cogenerator utilizes exhaust heat from industrial or
commercial combustion to drive an electric generator.22 The heat
source may be a kiln, furnace, waste incinerator, or other device, and
may burn a wide range of fuels.23 The heat may drive the generator
directly or convert water into steam to drive it.24 These systems are
particularly attractive because of their low operating temperatures25
and broad applications. Many industries that produce large amounts
of heat could begin to produce electrical energy without having to
redesign existing plant facilities.26 The power produced by the indus-
trial cogenerator could be used both to electrify the plant and as a
turbines they burn fuel within the turbine itself, as occurs with an aircraft engine.
The turbine turns a generator, and the exhaust flows into a boiler where it boils water
into steam. The systems must run on either oil or gas, but may be converted from one
to the other in only one day. OTA, supra note 15, at 126. They are generally more
efficient than steam turbines and have low pollutant emissions. N. DEAN, supra note
17, at 135.
Closed-cycle combustion cogenerators operate by heating a medium (air or helium)
in a closed space and directing the hot gas into a turbine. The turbine drives a gener-
ator which produces power. The exhaust gas runs through a boiler and produces
steam, and the gas circulates back into the turbine. OTA, supra note 15, at 127-28.
Closed-cycle systems offer greater efficiencies at partial load than open systems. Id
A diesel cogenerator is a diesel fueled reciprocating internal combustion engine
with a drive shaft that turns a generator and with a cooling system that generates
steam. The next generation of diesel cogenerators will offer 50% more power per
cylinder than current models. Id at 131-32.
20. A more ambitious use would be for district heating, in which exhaust steam
from power generation is pumped through underground steam lines to provide space
heating for neighboring buildings. District heating is widely used in Europe, and to a
lesser extent in the United States.
21. Consolidated Edison Co. in New York has operated a large cogenerating dis-
trict heating system since the nineteenth century. R. MEADOR, COGENERATION AND
DisTRicT HEATrING 13 (1981). See generally District Heating and Cooling: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Energy Development and Applications of the House Comm. on
Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1981).
22. Bottoming cogenerators have the advantage of not requiring additional fuel.
They use exhaust gas or steam from primary processes to run a turbine, which turns a
generator. N. DEAN, supra note 17, at 140.
23. See OTA, supra note 15, at 133-37.
24. Id at 133-34.
25. Units operate between 2000 and 6000 F. Id at 135.
26. Id at 180.
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commodity to sell back to the local utility.27
Some suggest that cogeneration has tremendous potential. One
federal agency foresees a potential cogeneration capacity of two hun-
dred thousand megawatts (mw) by the year 200028 or almost one-
third of all existing generating capacity on-line in 1980.29 While
practical considerations might restrain industry from realizing this to-
tal capacity,30 rising energy costs3 I and the realization that cogenera-
tion may be a commercially attractive alternative to utility-purchased
power may prompt some industrialists to regard cogeneration as a
viable investment.
Industrial cogeneration is perhaps America's single largest readily
available alternative energy source.32 One commentator suggests
that if industrial manufacturers were to begin cogenerating, the na-
tion would save up to five million barrels of oil a day. This amounts
to thirty-two percent of national oil consumption and fifteen percent
of total national energy consumption.33 Furthermore, if industry in-
vested twenty percent more capital into cogeneration, the nation
27. Section 210 does not permit QCFs or small power production facilities "to
make any sale for purposes other than resale," and it prohibits the FERC from mak-
ing rules authorizing non-resale transactions. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (1982). Conse-
quently, those facilities may not sell power directly to industrial, commercial, rural, or
residential consumers. This scheme retains the electric utilities' monopoly on distri-
bution and minimizes redundancy in the grid system. It may also have safety impli-
cations.
It is not clear why large industrial cogenerators should not sell power directly to
selected consumers such as other large industries. Possible benefits include lower
power costs through competition because rates would be based on true market forces
rather than the stiff avoided cost system. See infra note 68. The detriment would be
the direct loss to the utility of additional customers because the utility could no longer
serve as middleman.
28. OTA, supra note 15, at 10.
29. Total installed U.S. generating capacity in 1980 was 619,000 mw. Id
30. See infra notes 102-25 and accompanying text.
31. Although fuel costs have fluctuated in recent years, there is a general trend
toward price increases. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 1982 ANNUAL EN-
ERGY OUTLOOK xvi. Between 1975 and 1980 gas prices rose $1.41 per million BTUs
for industrial users. Prices will rise an additional $2.72 per million BTUs by 1985,
and will be $4.33 above 1980 rates by 1990. Id at xvii. Low grade industrial oil
prices rose $1.03 between 1975 and 1980 to $5.14 per million BTU, and the estimated
1990 price is $6.95 per million BTU. Id
32. Cogeneration would tap the tremendous waste in industrial process heat pro-
duction, which is self-contained. Unlike hydro, wind, or solar energy sources, waste
heat is easily tapped and requires no new technology.
33. N. DEAN, supra note 17, at 144.
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might save nineteen billion dollars by the mid-1980s34 Although
other alternative energy sources35 may contribute to energy savings,
they could not equal the potential power attainable by industrial
cogeneration without a significantly greater impact on the landscape
and the environment.36
III. ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION AND COGENERATION
A. Electric Utility Regulation
Federal and state authorities have regulated the generation and
distribution of electric power since the early twentieth century.37
Regulation precipitated from the confusion that accompanied the ap-
plication of laissez-faire competition to the distribution system."
Without centralized planning, competing firms created the danger of
utility wires crisscrossing a service area and the possibility of leaving
portions of the population without service when the power company
to which they subscribed went out of business.39 Legislators saw
competition as creating redundancy rather than efficiency, and ruled
that in order to protect the public's welfare, government would re-
place electricity production competition with a system authorizing
the government to grant a franchise to one company to supply the
needs of the community.4"
34. Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY, ENERGY INDUSTRIAL CENTER STUDY 273 (1975)
(available from the National Technical Information Service, No. PB 243-823).
35. See supra note 3.
36. Each alternative energy source takes its toll on the environment. Utilizing
solar energy requires large photovoltaic panels or mirrors. Wind power requires
windmills to be set atop hills or in other unobstructed (and thus visible) locations.
Hydro electric power requires the construction of dams, with the accompanying
detriments.
37. See supra notes 5-6.
38. A. FINDER, THE STATES AND ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATIONS 3-4 (1977).
39. Id
40. Id
Government regulation of electric utilities is often justified by the industry's ten-
dency toward natural monopoly. 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 117
(1971). Kahn summarizes the essence of the natural monopoly:
The critical-if properly defined-all-embracing characteristic of natural mo-
nopoly is an inherent tendency to decreasing unit costs over the entire extent of
the market. This is so only when the economies achievable by a larger output are
internal to the individual firm-if, that is to say, it is only as more output is
concentrated in a single supplier that unit costs will decline.
Id at 119. The "principle source" of this phenomenon is the need for high fixed costs
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Action on the federal level came during the depression of the
1930s .4  The Federal Power Commission (now the FERC) directly
regulated electric utilities under the Federal Power Act.42 Utility
holding companies43 came under the domain of the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935." Congress intended that these laws would prevent
monopolist utilities from gouging the public and would guarantee a
reliable source of electric power for the nation.45 These laws, how-
ever, produced an additional effect: coupled with state regulation,
they stifled non-utility electric power generation. 46 The laws swept so
broadly that any person or organization engaged in electricity pro-
duction for sale came within the regulation's coverage regardless of
its primary business.4 7 Compliance with these laws is an expensive
and complicated endeavor.48
The regulated industries themselves engaged in practices meant to
forestall any competition in the field of electric power production,49
(for generating and transmitting equipment) regardless of the number of units sold.
Id at 120. Consequently, "average costs per unit decline in inverse proportion to the
number of units sold." Id
Another factor in the tendency toward natural monopoly is economies of scale. Id
The monopoly remains efficient "as long as plants constructed for higher levels of
output will have lower average costs than smaller plants, or where it will cost less for
an existing supplier to add a given amount of capacity to its existing plant than for a
new supplier to supply it." Id Finally, "variability in demand" may be reduced if a
single supplier serves more customers over a larger region; the result should be lower
average costs for the utility. Id at 123.
41. See supra note 6.
42. ld The FERC regulates certain activities and sales, although the states con-
tinue to regulate prices for residential sales.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7) (1982) defines a public utility holding company as any
company that directly or indirectly owns 10% or more of the voting securities of a
public utility company.
44. See supra note 6.
45. PUHCA sought to prevent abuses by holding companies. Among company
abuses were the issuance of unsound securities, misdealings with subsidiaries, the
control of subsidiaries through small investment, and the expansion of the holding
companies when not in the best interests of ratepayers. 2 A. PRIEST, supra note 5, at
507. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in
Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
46. By 1980, consumption accounted for 97.3% of the available electricity capac-
ity. OTA, supra note 15, at 4.
47. N. DEAN, supra note 17, at 158-64.
48. Id at 160.
49. These activities included refusal to permit interconnection, refusal to allow
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even in areas where individuals were permitted to operate. 50 If an
industrial enterprise sought to supply its own electric needs, it could
expect little assistance from the local utility.51 The electric company
would refuse to supply backup power if the independent facility
failed, or else it would offer backup power at exorbitant rates. 52 The
utility would refuse to purchase surplus power, or would refuse to
permit interconnection by the individual into the utility grid.53 If the
utility agreed to purchase surplus power, the rates often were uncon-
scionably low.54
In the regulated environment of electric power production and dis-
tribution, the development of small scale alternative energy facilities
would have been impossible.5" Persons seeking to guarantee power
for themselves would have been rebuffed by utilities, and persons
seeking to generate power for sale would have been trapped in a for-
est of regulatory red tape. If Congress wanted to promote alternative
energy production on a grassroots level, it would have to create an
attractive environment for entrepreneurs by removing barriers to
market entry.
B. PURPA Section 210
Section 210 of PURPA56 encourages cogeneration and alternative
energy small power production by removing regulatory and institu-
tional barriers to non-utility generation for certain qualifying par-
ties.57  It provides a framework by which these parties can
feedback of power into the utility grid, high prices for backup power, low prices for
power purchased from private producers and others. Gentry, Public Utility Particioa-
tion in DecentralizedPower Production, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 316 (1981). See
generaly Cross, Cogeneration: Its Potential and Incentivesfor Development, 3 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 236, 242 (1979).
50. An industry that subjected itself to regulation would still have utility-made
barriers with which to cope.
51. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
52. Id
53. Id
54. Id
55. See Preamble to FERC Final Rules concerning Small Power Production Fa-
cilities and Cogeneration, 45 Fed. Reg. 17,959 (1980).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982).
57. See generally Lock, Encouraging Decentralized Generation of Electricity: Im-
plementation of the New Statutory Scheme, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 705, 711-15 (1980).
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interconnect5" with the local utility grid and buy and sell power to
that utility.59 Approved interconnection exempts the qualifying gen-
erator from most federal and state regulations relating to power pro-
duction6" and ownership of electricity producing entities.61 The
utilities must accept the existence of the unregulated power produc-
tion and deal fairly with the producers.62 Section 210 instructs the
FERC to administer the statute and further its purposes63 by making
rules for application by state public utility commissions.
Congress also outlined rates for the purchase and sale of power by
utilities.' It emphasized strongly that all such purchases and sales
must be just and reasonable to electricity consumers 65 and to the
public. 66 Furthermore, such rates may not discriminate against any
qualifying cogenerators or small power producers. 67 Electric utility
purchase rates may not exceed "the incremental cost of alternative
electric energy. ' 61 Consequently, a public utility commission69
58. Section 824a-3 requires the FERC to promulgate rules "to encourage cogener-
ation and small power production." The interconnection rules require the utility to
"make such interconnections with any qualifying facility as may be necessary to ac-
complish purchases or sales. . . ." 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(c)(1) (1984). "An intercon-
nection is a physical connection that allows electricity to flow from one entity to
another." FERC v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1921 (1983). In
American Electric Power, the Supreme Court held that the FERC rules under § 210
were not an abuse of discretion. In terms of interconnection, the Court upheld the
FERC rules that did not require an evidentiary hearing between the qualifying facil-
ity and the utility before interconnection. The Court noted correctly that to provide
for such hearings each time a QCF requested interconnection would seriously impede
congressional intent of expeditiously developing § 210 capacity. Id at 1931-33.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (1982). FERC rules require utilities to buy all power
the QCF has to offer and to sell to the QCF its requirements. 18 C.F.R.
§§ 292.303(a), (b) (1984).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (1982).
61. Id
62. Id §§ 824a-3(b), (c).
63. Id § 824a-3(a).
64. Id §§ 824a-3(b), (d).
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id
68. Id § 824a-3(b). PURPA § 210 limits the payments by electric utilities to
cogeneration and small power production facilities for power produced by those facil-
ities to no more than the incremental cost to the purchasing utility of alternative
power. Id §§ 824a-3 (b), (d). It defines "incremental cost of alternative" energy as
being the amount it would have cost for the utility either to generate the power itself
or purchase the power from some other source, such as a neighboring utility. Id
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charged by the FERC with establishing these "avoided cost" rates
can never require an electric utility to pay more for power than it
§ 824a-3(d). FERC's rule, 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.304(b)(2), (b)(4), requires utilities to
purchase power at rates "equal" to the incremental, or avoided, cost. The United
States Supreme Court upheld these rules in American Electric Power. See supra note
58.
The avoided cost formula itself causes much uncertainty among regulated utilities,
public utility commissions, and facilities. The primary questions concern what factors
should be included in the avoided cost calculation. Variables used by state commis-
sions for the calculation include energy costs and costs saved by reduced new con-
struction requirements (Re Connecticut Light and Power, 41 P.U.R. 4th 1
(Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Util. Control 1980)), the presence of a facility's contrac-
tual obligation to supply a given amount of power, i.e. "firmness of capacity" (Re
Rulemaking Proceeding for Consideration of Cogeneration and Small Power Produc-
tion, 40 P.U.R. 4th 563 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1980)), and a utility's annual carry-
ing charge for keeping the facility on line (170 IND. ADMIN. R. § 4-4-5 (Bums 1982)).
Indiana's public utility commission has created the following formula for calculation
of avoided cost:
Pj= full unadjusted rate for
ni purchase of energy in the
Pi = X i jth period.i=l1
nj ij = expected fuel and associated
variable operating costs for the
most expensive unit on line in
the ith hour of the jth period,
derived from recent data.
nj = number of hours in the jth
period.
Id § 4-4-8.
Choosing the source of the alternative power to be used as an avoided cost standard
is critical. In Appeal of Granite State Elec. Co., 121 N.H. 787, 435 A.2d 119 (1981),
the New Hampshire Supreme Court struck down state public utility commission rules
that calculated avoided costs based on the newest oil fired generating plant in the state
for every other utility in the state. By this calculation, Granite State paid 8.2¢r per
kilowatt hour of power purchased from small power facilities. It claimed that since it
had an excess of capacity, it could generate the same power for 7.7¢ per kilowatt hour.
The court held that the PUC had insufficient evidence with which to make the blanket
avoided cost determination, and that the "proxy" plant method was illegal unless all
utilities agreed to be measured in relation to that single plant. Id at 792, 435 A.2d at
122.
Statewide avoided cost rates are currently in effect in some states. See Lock, State-
wide Purchase Rates Under Section 210 of PUAPA, 3 SOLAR L. REP. 419 (1981).
69. See generally OTA, supra note 15, for purchase rates for power. Larger
cogenerators may (and often must) contract individually with utilities for purchase
rates.
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could have purchased from another source or generated by itself.7"
Section 210 exempts all QCFs and certain types of small power
producers71 from most regulations under the Federal Power Act, and
from state laws regulating electric power rates and financial and or-
ganizational requirements of utilities.7" Section 210 does not, how-
ever, exempt QCFs from state regulations made pursuant to FERC
edict,73 from federal law relating to interconnection with utilities
wheeling,74 or from certain licensing requirements.75
C. PURPA Section 201
In section 201,76 Congress outlines the types of generating capacity
that enjoys benefits under the section.77 It divides the technologies
into two categories, cogeneration and small power production,
although the basic requirements for both groups are substantially the
same. For both categories, Congress ordered the FERC to promul-
gate rules for qualifying facility size, fuel use requirements, effi-
ciency, and ownership criteria.78
The statute defines QCFs as cogenerators that produce electric en-
70. Nevertheless, higher-than-avoided cost payments are possible. See supra note
68.
71. Congress established size limitations for qualifying small power production
facilities, but not for cogenerators. Small power producers at any given site may not
be larger than 80 mw. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A)(ii) (1982). The FERC rules define
"site" as an area "within one mile of the facility for which qualification is sought." 18
C.F.R. § 292.204(a)(2) (1984). The rule for small hydro-electric power applies to fa-
cilities that operate off the same impoundment. Id See generally FERC Rules Con-
cerning Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 45 Fed. Reg. 17,959, 17,965
(1980).
72. See generally 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Utilities §§ 88-100 (1972) (description of
these regulations).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(3)(A) (1982).
74. Id Section 824i gives the FERC power to issue orders concerning intercon-
nection and purchase and sale between QCFs and utilities. Section 824j permits utili-
ties or QCFs to petition the FERC to "provide transmission services" to the applicant.
The statute promotes efficiency by requiring utilities to "wheel" power between sepa-
rate utility service areas. Previously, utilities located between service areas would
refuse to act (literally) as middleman in this scheme.
75. Id § 824a-3(e)(3)(C) (1982).
76. Id §§ 796(17), (18) (1982) (codified in pertinent part).
77. Congress amended PURPA in 1980 to include geothermal small power pro-
duction. 94 Stat. 770 (1980).
78. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17)(C)(i), (18)(B)(i) (1982).
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ergy and some form of useful energy, such as steam or heat.79 In
order for a QCF to qualify for section 210, it must comply with tech-
nical rules put forth by the FERC and state public utilities commis-
sions.8 0 The QCF must not be "owned by a person . . . primarily
engaged in the generation or sale of electric power" outside of the
small power facility itself."'
The section 201 requirements are ambiguous because they do not
define the word "own." While it is clear that the limitation is aimed
at regulated and self-regulating82 electric utilities, the word "own"
can take on widely varying interpretations. Under a strict reading,
section 201 might prohibit electric utility ownership of QCFs alto-
gether, because any equity interest is a form of ownership. Read
more broadly, ownership may be defined as full equity interest.
Under that interpretation, anything short of full equity interest would
fall outside of the prohibition. Consequently, an electric utility might
possess ninety-nine percent of the equity in a QCF, but still not
"own" it. The utility would be merely a partner to ownership. Fi-
nally, "ownership" may be defined as direct ownership of generating
properties. Therefore, indirect ownership through corporate subsidi-
aries would fall outside of the statutory prohibition.83
Section 201's legislative history does not illuminate these owner-
ship requirements. The conference report on the bills that became
PURPA"4 is no more explicit than the statute itself. The report inter-
prets the proper test as prohibiting an entity that is primarily engaged
in regulated power production from owning a QCF.s5 This standard
79. Id §§ 796 (18)(A), (B)(ii).
80. Id
81. Id §§ 796 (17)(C)(ii), 18(B)(ii).
82. A self-regulating utility is one that is not under the jurisdiction of a public
utility commission. See supra note 14.
83. A further interpretation of § 201's ownership requirement is ownership as
"control." Rather than looking to percentages of equity interest, such an analysis
would look to the quality of that interest, i.e., how much power the utility has m
decision-making. A scenario in which a utility comes within 50% while still exercising
voting control would be where two parties each own 49% of the shares of a QCF and
a utility owns 2%, and each share has one vote. When the parties are split on an issue,
the utility casts the deciding vote. If one of the 49% shareholders is the utility's "an-
gel," the utility always could maintain control. Such an arrangement could provide
the utility with leverage the FERC sought to forbid under its rules.
84. H. CONF. RaP. 95-1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 78, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7797, 7822-24.
85. Id at 7823.
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does permit a utility to own directly a percentage of a QCF.s6 It,
however, does not define the nature of non-utility QCF ownership
entities. Presumably, such an entity can be a wholly owned corporate
subsidiary of an electric utility. 7 It will pass the conference report's
test as long as the subsidiary's stated purpose is to engage in a busi-
ness other than regulated electric power production because the util-
ity will not own the QCF, but only shares in a subsidiary corporation.
A stricter approach would take into account any direct or indirect
ownership interest in an electric utility when determining section 210
qualifications.
The ambiguity in section 201 and its legislative history may be the
result of a legislative intent to give the FERC maximum freedom in
interpreting QCF ownership requirements.88 The FERC used this
ambiguity as license to establish rules varying substantially from the
aforementioned plain meaning analyses.
D. FERC Rules under Section 201
The FERC rules interpreting section 20189 take a middle view con-
cerning regulated electric company ownership of QCFs. The rules do
not prohibit those companies from owning QCFs, but limit their in-
terest in them to no more than fifty percent of outstanding equity.90
This "fifty percent rule" applies to both direct and subsidiary owner-
ship.91 Thus, the FERC will not look to the owner of record of QCF
assets, but will look "upstream" in order to determine where final
decision-making control lies.92 A restricted person, therefore, may
86. Id
87. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
88. Alternatively, the ambiguity may have resulted from the inability of opposing
congressional factions to decide whether or not to permit electric utilities to own fully
QCFs. Whether such disagreement actually demonstrates an aflirmative intent is
questionable.
89. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.101 -.602 (1984).
90. Id § 202.206(b).
91. Id In its comments accompanying the rule, the FERC addressed the possibil-
ity that PURPA would permit several utilities to own jointly the shares of a corpora-
tion owning a cogenerator without violating the QCF ownership requirements. It
stated "that the thrust of section 201 of PURPA is to limit the advantages of qualify-
ing status to cogeneration and small power production facilities which are not owned
primarily by electric utilities and their subsidiaries." 45 Fed. Reg. 17,970 (1980) (em-
phasis added).
92. See supra note 85.
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own fifty percent of a QCF, fifty percent of a company which owns
all of a QCF, or all of a company which owns fifty percent of a QCF,
but no other combination.
In comments accompanying the ownership regulations, the FERC
justified its restrictive interpretation of section 201 by identifying
what it called a "thrust" in PURPA that will exclude utilities from
QCF benefits.93 The limitation is not based on those persons' mo-
nopoly power, but on the concern that "such companies would divert
scarce capital resources or convert existing jurisdictional facilities
from regulated to unregulated qualifying facilities." 94 The comments
go no further in explaining the FERC's restrictive interpretation, and
the rationale stated seems unsatisfying. If the FERC is indeed con-
cerned that regulated electric utilities will neglect their primary duties
for which the government has granted an exclusive franchise, then it
is anomalous that the Commission has granted nongenerating regu-
lated utilities the ability to own fully QCFs.95 Apparently, the FERC
is not concerned sufficiently with the possibility of investment distor-
tion in non-electric utilities to limit those utilities' investment pat-
terns, although it clearly has jurisdiction to do this.96 Without
adequate explanation of where the FERC located Congress' "thrust"
in PURPA, the Commission's rationale is open to challenge.
9 7
E. QCF Development after PURPA
PURPA and the FERC rules clearly have sparked interest in QCF
development. By April 1982, the FERC had received applications
for over three thousand mw of cogenerated capacity, sixty percent of
which consisted of new installations.98 Despite this early flurry of
93. See supra note 91.
94. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,788 (1980).
95. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,779 (1980). For example, natural gas utilities are not re-
stricted in QCF ownership. Similarly, no telephone companies are restricted,
although none are cogenerating. There is really no reason to believe that one of these
utilities would be less likely to divert funds from its regulated to its unregulated busi-
ness, particularly if the unregulated business is profitable.
96. See supra note 14.
97. Presently, no one has challenged the § 201 rules in court. If the electric utility
industry had intended to challenge them it probably would have done so. Because of
the broad discretion the Supreme Court gave the FERC in American Electric Power,
supra notes 58 & 68, the utilities probably would be unsuccessful.
98. Senate Amendments, supra note 8, at 78 (statement of Edison Electric Insti-
tute). By January 1, 1984, the FERC had granted 162 applications for certification as
a qualifying cogeneration facility, and had denied only two applications. Mercy
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activity, and notwithstanding the relatively brief period that the regu-
latory mechanisms have been in place, it is becoming increasingly
clear that the technical potential for QCF power and the actual por-
tion that industry is likely to realize are widely divergent.99 Business
and industry are not taking advantage of all available opportunities
at present and there is reason to suspect that the factors responsible
for the constraint on development will not diminish over time.
00
Although a "wait and see" attitude'0 1 may allow persons who are
beyond the scope of the "primarily engaged" test as interpreted by
the FERC to maximize QCF potential on their own, the following
reasons for their nonmaximization of potential would lead to the op-
posite conclusion.
1. Finite Capital
Cogeneration facilities cost between $350 and $1,600 per kilowatt
of generating capacity.' 2 A moderately sized QCF requires a mini-
mum initial investment of between $5.25 million and $24 million, not
including cost of additional steam lines, interconnection and other
items.1° Marginal operating costs also can be high."° Many indus-
Hosp. and Medical Center, 18 F.E.R.C. 61,128 (1982) (denial based on failure to
satisfy efficiency standards); Granite City Steel Div., Nat'1. Steel Corp., 14 F.E.R.C.
61,098 (1981) (denial based on applicant's erroneous interpretation of "cogeneration
facility").
99. See infra text accompanying notes 134-36.
100. See infra notes 102-22 and accompanying text.
101. The California Public Utilities Commission has adopted this view. See The
Utility Role in Cogeneration and Small Production: Hearings on H.. 2876 and H.RA
2992 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 450-51 (1981) [hereinafter cited as House
Amendments] (statement of Barbara Barkovich, Director of Policy and Planning, Cal-
ifornia Public Utilities Commission); id at 186-208 (statement of Michael J. Zimmer,
Washington Counsel, Cogeneration Coalition, Inc.).
102. OTA, supra note 15, at 9. Prices vary according to unit capacity and technol-
ogy type, and there is substantial overlap between technologies. The least expensive
unit is diesel topping, and the most expensive is closed-cycle ("organic") bottoming.
103. This auxiliary noninterconnection equipment includes high pressure steam
equipment, piping, and water softeners. These supply a relatively constant steam flow
of 50,000 pounds of steam per hour at 400-500 psi. N. DEAN, supra note 17, at 142-43.
Interconnection costs vary with generator size. The cost per kilowatt hour capacity
increases with every decrease in size of unit output. A 20 mw system will cost $35 per
kw/hr to interconnect, and a two kw system will cost $1,328. OTA, supra note 15, at
157.
104. Id at 121. Costs range from $.26-3.30 per kw/hr annual fixed costs (fuel cell
topping) to $6-8 kw/hr annual fixed costs for diesel topping.
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tries may be unwilling to place such large investment into secondary
processes, preferring instead to invest the funds into their primary
processes. 10 5 Although federal and state law provides a number of
financing programs10 6 and tax incentives, the industrial manager ulti-
mately must rely on his desire to commit substantial amounts of re-
sources into what is to him only a supplementary business venture.
Many basic industries that generate substantial amounts of heat are
unable to retool primary processes, let alone invest in diversified
holdings.'0 7 In short, the primary consideration for most managers is
the financial health of the company.
2. Limited Expertise
Persons who are capable of operating generating equipment are
not readily available in the unregulated sector. This is so because
technical expertise in electric power generation traditionally has been
concentrated in the regulated industries. Central station generation
has decreased the number of generating facilities, which has led to
requirements of fewer persons necessary to operate the equipment.
Although cogenerators are not always highly sophisticated, capital
costs are sufficiently high that an industrialist would not want to in-
stall capacity absent assurance that qualified technicians were readily
available.
Although cogeneration once was widely adopted in industry,"' 8 at
least a generation has passed since industry became reliant on central
105. Senate Amendments, supra note 8, at 66-68 (statement of Ralph C. Mitchell
III, Vice President, Conservation and Renewable Resources, Arkansas Power & Light
Co.); id at 69 (statement of Frederic E. Greenman, Vice President and Associate
General Counsel, New England Power Co.) ("The lesson that we learned was clear.
Non-utilities are reluctant to invest in cogeneration projects. They are uncomfortable
putting money into projects that are foreign to their area of expertise.").
106. See OTA, supra note 15, at 105. A 10% Energy Tax Credit expired on Dec.
31, 1982. See I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(C)(i) (1982).
107. This condition results from greater professional opportunities in newer areas
of high technology such as the microprocessing industry. Recently, students have
begun to enter the area of power distribution, which interest should be furthered by
congressional entry into cogeneration legislation. Telephone interview with Walter
Kahn, Professor of Electrical Engineering, The George Washington University (May
16, 1984). See generally Morgan, Electric Power Engineering Education National
Trends, E-21 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EDUCATION 91 (1978).
108. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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station power.109 Consequently, industry may be unfamiliar with the
function and operation of the technologies involved. A business may
be unwilling to permit an unfamiliar piece of hardware on its plant
premises that may increase costs and become integrally tied to plant
operations. Decision-makers may perceive that if the cogenerator
fails, thermal operations must halt until the cogenerator is re-
paired." While this scenario is possible, sound facility design will
enable generation and thermal production to be wholly unrelated."'
Finally, a company may be unwilling to engage in an activity that
can raise its insurance rates and lead to greater potential tort
liability."12
3. Unacceptable Return on Investment
Many industries require diversified investments to yield a twenty-
five to thirty percent investment return." 3 The return must be at
least as high or higher than a company's investment in its primary
business. Unfortunately, many applications of cogeneration may be
unable to provide a rate of return sufficiently high to meet that
109. Industrial self-generation has provided less than 10% of total capacity in the
United States since the late 1950s. OTA, supra note 15, at 4.
110. This may be the case with most topping cogenerators, where process heat is a
by-product of power generation. Industries that plan to cogenerate as an ancillary
investment and use topping technology should provide for a by-pass system with
which process steam output will not be interrupted by generator failures. Industries
that plan to cogenerate as an ancillary investment and use topping technology should
provide for a by-pass system with which process steam output will not be interrupted
by generator failures.
111. Bottoming cogenerators, where power production operates off waste heat,
should be relatively easy to build so that power production and thermal production
are separable.
112. A utility worker can be injured while performing line repairs if the cogener-
ator continued to feed the grid after the line worker thought that he had disconnected
all power sources. It is likely that most interconnecting utilities will require a cut-out
switch accessible by the utility in order to avoid this type of accident.
Additionally, a QCF could cause damage to the utility grid if the facility malfunc-
tions. One utility provides system protection by requiring: 1) Installation of circuit
breakers that automatically disconnect the QCF from the grid if utility feed is lost;
2) calibration by the utility of all protective relay settings; and 3) a disconnect switch
within the exclusive control of the utility. UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY, ELECTRIC
POWER PURCHASES FROM QUALIFYING FACILITIES 2-3 (Feb. 14, 1983).
113. The Potentialfor Indrtrial Cogeneration Development by 1990, cited in Senate
Amendments, supra note 8, at 96. One utility found that industry requires cogenera-
tion to return a minimum of 25% on invested capital. House Amendments, supra note
101, at 39 (statement of Edison Electric Institute).
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standard. " 1
4
4. Regulatory Uncertainty
All industrial enterprises are subject to extensive government regu-
lation in many facets of operation. After years of compliance an en-
terprise becomes familiar with the intrusion, but not comfortable.
Potential enterprises are reluctant to engender additional and unfa-
miliar regulations. QCF ownership is subject to regulation even
though PURPA attempts to eliminate as much regulation as possi-
ble." '5 Thus, while an industry-owned QCF is not subject to rate
regulation, it must abide by efficiency, interconnection, safety, relia-
bility, and fuel use standards." 6 While larger potential QCFs may
be able to pay for extensive legal and technical advice concerning
these regulations, these costs can be unacceptably high to small and
moderately sized firms.
The stability of purchase rates is also of concern to the potential
cogenerator. Avoided cost-based purchase rates are regulated by
state public utility commissions (PUCs)," 7 and these rates change
along with fluctuations in market rates for power." 8 Avoided cost
rates that are profitable at the inception of a QCF project may be-
come unacceptable after the unit comes on line and rates change.
While risk inheres in any capital investment, political factors in PUC
ratemaking" 9 may discourage industries that are unfamiliar with
114. Because it is not possible to gauge potential rates of return in all situations,
pay back rates vary with each projection. The Dow Chemical Company forecasts
that a steam turbine with a 400,000 lbs./hr. steam load could earn a pre-tax pay back
of 20%. N. DEAN, supra note 17, at 200 (quoting Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY, Supra
note 34). An oil-fired boiler with gas turbine topping cogeneration could earn 25%.
Id at 200-01. A different study projects steam turbine topping to yield 7% to 27%, gas
turbine 25% to 39%, diesel topping 21% to 23%, and bottoming cycle approximately
22%. Id at 201.
Businesses sometimes require extraordinary rates of return on subsidiary invest-
ments. For example, a cement manufacturer decided not to invest in a 4.7 mw bot-
toming cogenerator because the system could only offer 22% pay back even though
the manufacturer's usual rate of return on investment was 15% Id One study deter-
mined that it would take a 32% rate of return in order to get 80% of potential cogener-
ators to build facilities. Id
115. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 69.
119. See generally 1 A. PtUEsT, supra note 5, at 45-138. For an enlightening view
of the most political aspect of ratemaking, the ratemaking hearing, see Jacobs, Utility
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/10
PURPA QUALIFYING COGENERATORS
regulated pricing. Similarly, non-electric utilities may be unfamiliar
with the cycles of power industry rates.
5. Instability of Fuel Prices
Avoided cost rates are tied to the price electric utilities must pay
for either purchased or self-generated power. 120 These rates depend
to a great extent on fuel costs. A QCF using a fuel differing from that
used by the electric utility with which it is interconnected is thus at
risk of financial loss if its own fuel costs are higher than the utility's
costs. For example, a diesel cogenerator interconnected with a coal-
fired utility will lose money in its generation business if its marginal
fuel costs are higher than the utility's avoided costs. In this instance,
a long-term rise in world petroleum prices will render power genera-
tion unprofitable.' 21
6. Environmental Regulations
Federal and state air quality standards limit the quantity of pollu-
tants an industrial operation may emit. 12 2 An industry's available
license to pollute is thus as finite and as valuable a resource as land or
capital. Because all forms of cogeneration will introduce pollutants
into the environment and a portion of that amount is attributable to
electric power production rather than to primary process, a potential
cogenerator must decide whether available pollution margins should
be dedicated to power production. Many firms may choose to save
these units for primary business purposes.
F. Electric Utility Industry QCF Joint Ventures
The FERC realized that industry would face the aforementioned
barriers to cogeneration when it introduced the fifty percent owner-
ship rule. Apparently, the Commission intended for utilities to pro-
vide technical and management expertise, and for the nonutility to
supply capital, land, and a heat source. Theoretically, such joint ven-
tures appear sound.
Rate Hearings are Sometimes Lively andAiways Complex, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1974, at
1, col. 6, reprinted in T. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 215-18
(1976),
120. See supra note 68.
121. See supra note 31.
122. See generally 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.03 (2d ed.
1978).
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In practice, utilities and industry have encountered difficulty in
carrying out the joint ventures, largely because of lack of industry
involvement.123 Several utilities have found only one or two indus-
trial partners in their service areas, even when those areas contained
hundreds of steam users.' 24 The main reasons given by the noncon-
forming industries for their nonparticipation were the lack of capital
and the undesirability of entering operations outside of their primary
line of business.' 25
The fifty percent rule also has limited the types of industries with
which a utility will seek to form a partnership. Utilities require a
QCF to have a large steam requirement 126 in order to produce a prof-
itable return. A utility service area may contain only a few large
steam users but a greater number of smaller users. Recent history
reveals no one user to be developing smaller QCF potential. 2 7 The
smaller thermal users are not likely to become QCFs themselves, 28
therefore, the potential capacity is wasted.
123. See supra note 105.
124. For example, Arkansas Power commissioned a study of 1,500 oil- and gas-
fired steam producers and found at least 35 producers which were "prime candidates"
for cogeneration. Of those 35, the utility found none, with the possible exception of
two paper product companies, which was likely to invest in cogeneration. Senate
Amendments, supra note 8, at 67 (statement of Ralph C. Mitchell III, Vice President,
Conservation and Renewable Resources, Arkansas Power and Light Co.). New Eng-
land Power Company undertook a similar study and achieved similar results. Id at
68-69 (statement of Frederic E. Greenman, Vice President and Associate General
Counsel, New England Power Co.). New England Power had planned to build a 15
mw wood-burning cogenerator but had great difficulty finding a partner. Id The
utility finally located a partner, but only because the partner's corporate parent was
heavily involved in the energy industry. Id at 69.
125. See supra note 105.
126. See supra note 114.
127. Most industrial cogeneration facilities are fairly large. Examples include:
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 2.07 mw; Chevron USA, Inc., 2.5 mw, 7.5 mw, 10 mw, 4.3
mw; Hooker Chemicals and Plastic Corp., 42.4 mw; Hunt Wesson Foods, 1.0 mw.
Senate Amendments, supra note 8, at 243-46.
Generally, the regulated sector has practiced utility cogeneration only on a large
scale basis. San Diego Gas and Electric owns a subsidiary that produces 61 mw of
power and 510,000 lb./hr. of steam. Gulf State Utilities has 100 mw of cogeneration
capacity which produces 15-19 billion pounds of steam annually. That utility plans to
add an additional 300 mw of capacity by the year 1990. Id at 76-77 (statement of
Edison Electric Institute).
128. Problems that large industries encountered in their approach to cogeneration
are magnified in small companies.
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G. Rationale for the Belief that Full Electric Utility QCF
Ownership will Result in More Cogeneration
It is clear that electric utilities are better equipped to begin large
scale cogeneration when compared with other industries. Many of
the entry barriers felt by other businesses either do not factor into the
electric utilities' investment equation at all, or are only minor factors.
On the other hand, some of the barriers apply to all industries.
The utilities' strongest asset in entering QCF generation is their
experience in power generation and marketing. All of the necessary
technical and administrative frameworks are in place. QCF owner-
ship requires little if any adaptation by utility management. An elec-
tric utility does not incur an opportunity cost when it invests in
cogeneration. Unlike a non-utility, which must treat cogeneration as
a supplemental investment, a utility is able to keep this within its
primary business of power production.
Another advantage for a utility is the industry's satisfaction with
lower rates of return on investment. 29 The lower QCF payback will
not deter the traditional investor because these investors are accus-
tomed to lower rates of return than are speculating investors.130 Util-
ities will be more accessible to QCF investment capital than an
unregulated industry because the latter must justify its low rates of
return to its shareholders. Additionally, utilities have extensive regu-
latory compliance mechanisms in place that serve to lower compli-
ance costs. As a result, electric utilities are in a position to comply
more easily with the various federal and state statutes and regulations
applicable to all forms of power production.
13 1
Finally, utilities will be more likely to congenerate if the restraints
of the joint venture requirement are removed. Utilities will not need
to convince already unwilling industrialists of the benefits of cogener-
ation. 3 2 Instead, they can act on opportunities immediately because
the opportunity needs to attract one party only.
Despite the advantages of full electric utility QCF ownership in
creating more cogeneration, counter-arguments also are compelling.
129. Senate Amendments, supra note 8, § 2.18; OTA, supra note 15, at 20.
130. Utility shares traditionally have been low yield investments with a high de-
gree of stability. For that reason persons engaged in the investment field in earlier
periods referred to them as stocks for "widows and orphans."
131. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
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Potential utility abuse of the institutional arrangements created by
QCF ownership can generate short- and long-term losses, resulting in
higher regulated power costs. 33 To determine the desirability of full
electric utility QCF ownership requires an analysis of its benefits and
detriments. Such an analysis will reveal whether a change in owner-
ship rules is warranted, and what limitations, if any, should be placed
on utility QCF involvement.
IV. POSSIBLE BENEFITS FROM FULL ELECTRIC UTILITY QCF
OWNERSHIP
Arguments for full electric utility QCF involvement concentrate on
the ability of the one hundred percent rule to: 1) Spur development
of cogeneration capacity and technology in a manner that maximizes
use of abundant fuels; and 2) mitigate the losses electric utilities will
realize as a result of non-utility QCF development.
A. Promotion of Cogeneration
1. Increased Capacity
By the year 1990, industry will fail to tap an estimated twenty to
sixty percent of potential congeneration capacity totalling 2,700 mw
to 9,300 mw.'34 In the year 2000, industry will create the technical
potential for two hundred thousand mw capacity.135 If the twenty to
sixty percent gap in capacity realization continues, between forty
thousand and one hundred twenty thousand mw capacity will be lost.
Although estimates of projected national electric capacity require-
ments vary, one respected projection foresees a demand for three
hundred thousand mw additional capacity by the next century. 36
Lost cogeneration opportunities will necessitate substantial new
amounts of central station power. At least a portion of that construc-
tion will be non-cogenerating oil- or gas-fired capacity. Even if such
new capacity is highly fuel efficient there will be inherent inefficien-
cies and wasted heat. 137 Furthermore, oil- or gas-fired non-cogener-
ating capacity will not reduce America's dependence on foreign
133. See infra notes 181-96.
134. Senate Amendments, supra note 8, at 79 (statement of Edison Electric
Institute).
135. OTA, supra note 15, at 10.
136. Id at 52.
137. See supra note 1.
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fuels.138
2. Benefits of Increased Competition
Generally, commentators agree that market competition is superior
to governmental regulation for providing consumers with high qual-
ity, innovative products at the lowest possible cost. 139 Superior ser-
vice and innovation are hallmarks of product markets with
substantial competition and high consumer demand, such as com-
puter manufacturing." 4 Such competition in the cogeneration field
could yield comparable results in the areas of technologies and ser-
vice to users.
3. Greater Supplies of Low-Cost Steam and Heat
Because cogeneration will create both electric and thermal energy
for little more than the price of either created alone, 14 1 increased
cogeneration will reduce the price of process heat by increasing sup-
ply and lowering fuel costs. This may encourage development in in-
dustries that utilize steam or heat. A rise in cogeneration as a result
of increased utility activity will thus have this "spin-off" effect.
4. Increased Consumption of Coal
Coal fuel is abundant in the United States 142 and is an attractive
alternative to petroleum derivatives or natural gas as an industrial
fuel. Acceleration of coal use in energy production will help realize
energy independence. 143  Historically, electric utilities have relied
138. The Energy Information Administration projects an increase of net imports
of petroleum products of 5.3 million barrels a day over 1982 imports. ENERGY IN-
FORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 3 1, at xvi.
139. Some early and seminal criticisms of government regulation include Stigler
& Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J. OF L. &
ECON. 1 (1962); Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. OF L. & ECON.
1(1959).
140. Competition also has its negative attributes. Recent history suggests the vul-
nerability of some industries. The mortality rate of computer entrepreneurs is high,
bond values for firms such as AT&T have plummetted, and airlines such as Braniff
have declared bankruptcy.
141. See supra note 18.
142. The Energy Information Administration projects one billion tons of annual
coal production by 1990. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, at
81. Coal exports by that year should top 143 million tons annually. Id at 83.
143. Congress codified this attitude in the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended in applicable
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upon coal as a source of power.'" Many utilities are highly sophisti-
cated in the acquisition and combustion of coal. Some electric utili-
ties own captive mines through subsidiaries of which the entire
output is dedicated to satisfying the utility's requirements. 145 Other
utilities have well-established channels through which they are as-
sured a steady coal supply.
Widespread cogeneration spurred by electric utility involvement
likely will result in the displacement of oil- and gas-fired installations
by coal use. For example, a coal-fired electric utility QCF engaged in
topping cogeneration might sell its exhaust heat or steam to a nearby
business. The purchaser will be freed from creating the heat himself.
If the purchaser had either engaged in or planned to engage in oil- or
gas-fired thermal production, the national economy will realize a net
reduction in oil or gas consumption. On a widespread basis these
reductions can be substantial. 146
5. Superior Integration of Low or High Marginal Cost
Generation Capacity
Different types of generating capacity create varying marginal
costs for produced power." 7 Electric utility generation structure is
sections of chapter 42 U.S.C.). The statute explains that its purpose is "to encourage
and foster the greater use of coal and other alternate fuels, in lieu of natural gas and
petroleum, as a primary energy source." 42 U.S.C. § 8301(b)(3) (1982). See generally
Toll & Cottingham, Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 and Possible
Amendments Thereto, I1 ST. MARY's L.J. 653 (1980).
144. Coal has far outstripped any other fuel as a heat source for electric utility
power plants. In 1982 utilities generated 20.36 quadrillion BTU (quads) of heat. Of
that figure, coal accounted for 8.79 quad, or approximately 40% of all heat produc-
tion. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, at 192. The Adminis-
tration projects an increase to 16.6 quad, or approximately 51% of utility heat
production. Id
145. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Billinger, 632 P.2d 1086 (Mont.
1981); Paper delivered by Samuel Huntington, Edison Electric Institute Legal Com-
mittee Meeting (October, 1981), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNUAL
REPORT, SECTION ON PUBLIC UTILITY LAW 93 (1982).
146. For a forecast of energy trends, see generally ENERGY INFORMATION AD-
MINISTRATION, supra note 31.
Utilities more and more turn to coal to the exclusion of other energy forms. Re-
cently, Cincinnati Gas & Electric decided to convert a 97% completed nuclear-fueled
powerplant to coal because of high completion costs. Brooks, Utilities'Plan to Switch
Zimmer Plant from Nuclear to Coal Raises Questions, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1984, at 3,
col. 4.
147. Because avoided cost calculations are largely based on fuel costs and capac-
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arranged so that base capacity (such as large central station genera-
tors) has a low marginal operating cost and peaking capacity (such as
small diesel units) has a relatively high marginal Cost.14 1 Presently,
utilities operate equipment with the lowest marginal cost whenever
possible to realize maximum profit and to maintain the lowest possi-
ble rates, thereby stimulating demand.149 The FERC rules have, to a
certain extent, disturbed coordination of high and low cost genera-
tion capacity. The rules require utilities to purchase a QCF's entire
output at full avoided cost regardless of the utility's needs. 5 ' If the
avoided cost purchase rates that the utility must pay to the QCF are
higher than the marginal cost of self-generated power,' 51 ratepayers
are forced to absorb the additional revenue paid to the QCF.152 Fur-
thermore, the redundancy in generating capacity will create a misal-
location of society's resources.
ity costs, changes in either will affect greatly avoided cost calculation. See supra note
68.
148. In this manner the utility uses the lowest cost generation capacity most
effectively.
149. Demand in the summer is important because hot weather-spurred air condi-
tioning causes a period of peak consumption for utilities. Air conditioning is, in
many applications, a discretionary consumption of power. In most cases lack of air
conditioning is not life-threatening. If power prices are too high, the discretionary
user will turn his air conditioner off and the utility will lose revenue in a high revenue
season. By keeping peak period prices low, the utility can realize greater income.
150. 18 C.F.R. § 292-303(a) (1984).
151. See supra note 68.
152. Standard PUC ratemaking formulas take into account expenses incurred by
the utility in operations. The higher the expenses incurred, the higher the utility tar-
iffs become. Avoided cost payments made by the utility to a QCF would enter into
operating costs and raise tariffs. The following is a fairly sophisticated representation
of the standard ratemaking formula:
RR = E + d + T + (V-D)R
RR = Required Revenue
E = Operating Expenses
d = annual depreciation expense
T = taxes
V = value of property serving public
D = accrued depreciation
R = return on investment
V-D = ratebase
(V-D)R = Profit
OTA, supra note 15, at 63.
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B. Increased Utility Financial Stability
At least as pressing as the need to advance cogeneration is the need
to stabilize the financially troubled utility industry.' 3 A number of
factors in recent years have led to what some analysts consider a cri-
sis point.'5 4 Operating costs of oil- and gas-fired capacity have risen
with fuel costs.'55 Staggering cost overruns in nuclear facility con-
struction have led to the specter of default for several utilities.' 5 6
State PUCs have failed to grant rate of return increases commensu-
153. Investment analysts express their confidence in a business' financial health
through bond ratings. In 1970, 60% of all utility bond issuers had a Standard and
Poors rating of AA minus or higher (AAA is highest). By 1981, that percentage had
fallen to 29%. Utility Financing: Hearings on the Financial Condition of Utilities and
their Future in the 1980s Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Utility Financing] (statement of Matthew Holden, Jr., Commissioner, Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission, quoting testimony of Ann Faber, Standard and
Poor's).
154. See The Future of the Nation's Energy Utilities: Implications for Federal
R.D.&D.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Development andApplications of
the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981) [herein-
after cited as R.D.&D. ]. See also Gentry supra note 49, at 299-302. See generally
Utility Financing, supra note 153. Cf. A Dark Future for Utilities, Bus. WEEK, May
28, 1978, at 46.
155. Rising fuel costs have caused utilities to shift to coal and nuclear capacity,
with concomitant long lead times and publicly perceived adverse side effects. See
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 31, at xv.
156. See Pulling the Nuclear Plug, TIME, Feb. 13, 1984, at 34. In 1983 the Wash-
ington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) defaulted on $2.25 billion in bonds for
two abandoned power plants (WPPSS-4 and WPPSS-5). WPPSS Defaults, 112 PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Aug. 18, 1983, at 53. The Bonneville Power Administration now seeks
to guarantee or pay off loans in order to procure loans from wary lenders for the
purpose of completing WPPSS-3, a nearly finished nuclear plant. St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch, May 14, 1984, at 2C, col. 3.
Meanwhile cost overruns continue to force nuclear plant cancellations. Marble Hill
was scrapped by the Public Service Company of Indiana. St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Jan. 17, 1984, at 2A, col. 1. New England Power Company canceled its Pilgrim II and
was then denied cost recovery. Wall St. J., June 13, 1984, at 8, col. I.
Analysts warn investors of the risks involved in utility investments when nuclear
problems are apparent. See, e.g., Quinn, Utility Stocks in the Spotlight, NEWSWEEK,
June 18, 1984, at 80. Poor bond ratings have forced some electric utilities to seek
high-interest bank loans. Simions & McCoy, Nuclear Utilities' Money Raising is Dis-
rupted by Industry Problems, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, at 35, col. 4; Bailey, Utilities with
Troubled Nuclear Units Turn to Banks as Bond Ratings Fall, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1984,
at 3, col. 2. Some of these same utilities are now on the brink of bankruptcy. See
Wald, Utilities' Chapter 11 Prospects, Wall St. J., June 26, 1984, at 1.
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rate with these developments.' 57 In addition, fluctuations in con-
sumer demand for power have made it difficult for many utilities to
earn more than seventy-five percent of their allowed rate of return. 158
As a result of these financial problems, 1981 utility stock traded at
about one-half of its 1965 market value, 5 9 and in 1980 traded at less
than seventy-three percent of book value. 6 Between 1970 and 1980,
electric utility common shares averaged an eleven percent return on
investment, while shares of competing investments rose from a ten
percent rate of return in 1970 to a fifteen percent return in 1980.161
Obviously, a change is in order.
There is, of course, no simple solution to the problems facing
America's power industry. Congress is taking a closer look at the
problem, 62 although action may not be forthcoming until there is an
actual crisis. One possible solution that commentators and the elec-
tric utility industry are advancing is power production decentraliza-
tion through utility ownership of QCFs and small power production
facilities. 63 Decentralization would benefit utility financial status in
two ways: 1) by providing an additional source of revenue; and 2)
by offsetting losses utilities will realize when major industrial power
consumers begin to cogenerate and cease to be utility customers.
1. Cogeneration as an Additional Source of Revenue
Recently, utilities have argued in favor of diversification. 164 Many
are engaged in energy related fields such as coal mining, 65 while
157. Studness, Genesis of the Current Financial Plight of Electric Utilities, 105 PUB.
UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1980, at 54.
158. R.D.&D., supra note 154, at 3 (statement of Charles Benore, Vice President,
Paine, Webber, Mitchell & Hutchins).
159. Id at 2.
160. Utility Financing, supra note 153, at 1 (opening statement of Hon. Richard L.
Ottinger).
161. R.D.&D., supra note 154, at 2 (statement of Charles Benore, Vice President,
Paine, Webber, Mitchell & Hutchins).
162. The hearings cited above are the extent of the involvement, as Congress has
enacted no new legislation on the issue. If utilities' financial status continues to de-
cline, legislative action may be the only viable solution.
163. See Gentry, supra note 49, at 307-11; RD.&D., supra note 154, at 88 (state-
ment of Edison Electric Institute); Senate Amendments, supra note 8, at 181 (statement
of Peter W. Brown, Director, Energy Law Institute).
164. See generally York & Malko, Utility Diverspication: A Regulatory Perspec-
ti'e, Ill PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 6, 1983, at 15.
165. See supra text accompanying note 145.
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others have entered wholly unrelated fields.' 66 These holdings pro-
vide the utilities revenues independent of regulated operations.
These revenues will mitigate hardships suffered by a decline in power
demand.
QCF ownership can be a profitable subsidiary investment for an
electric utility. Irrespective of the demand for power or losses stem-
ming from regulated capacity, QCFs will remain profitable as long as
operating costs remain below avoided costs. Because the parent com-
pany is obligated by the FERC regulations to purchase the QCF's
entire power output, electricity demand will not factor into revenues.
2. Mitigate Losses from Industrial Cogeneration
Every kilowatt of new industrial capacity creates a double loss for
electric utilities. First, the utility has lost a source of revenue. Rather
than purchasing from the utility, the cogenerator produces its own
power. The resulting decrease in the utility's income necessitates a
shifting of the former customer's contributions to the utility's costs,
and a ratebase return to other customers.1 67 Second, the cogenerator
is not a utility supplier, with the utility guaranteeing purchase of
cogenerator output. At times when instantaneous avoided cost 68 is
lower than designated avoided costs, the utility will lose money.
Full utility QCF ownership would mitigate some of these losses by
providing additional revenues.1 69 Each kilowatt of utility QCF
power would offset a kilowatt of industrial QCF power. The utility
would realize a loss only to the extent of the fixed cost of the QCF 1 70
V. POSSIBLE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF FULL ELECTRIC UTILITY
OWNERSHIP OF QCFs
Arguments against full electric utility ownership of QCFs are
founded in the potential conflicts that arise when unregulated and
166. In 1984, for example, a subsidiary of Laclede Gas Company, St. Louis, Mis-
souri, began a direct solicitation of utility customers for the purpose of selling life
insurance.
167. See generaly I A. PRiEST, supra note 5, at 327-45.
168. Instantaneous avoided cost is the marginal cost a utility realizes at the mo-
ment it adds an additional kilowatt of power to the grid.
169. The utility ratepayer would receive a benefit only if a governing public utili-
ties commission requires the utility to take nonregulated income into account in cal-
culating revenue requirements, thus permitting the benefit to "flow through."
170. The utility would recover that fixed cost over time.
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regulated firms compete in the same market when the unregulated
participant must deal directly with the regulated participant. 7 ' One
can place these potential conflicts into three categories: a) unfair
competition; b) self-dealing; and c) regulated utility rate and
planning distortion. These problems may lead to the monopolization
of the QCF industry by electric utilities coupled with the simultane-
ous gouging of utility ratepayers.
A. Unfair Competition
PURPA section 210 emphasizes that the QCF-electric utility rela-
tionship must be just, fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. 72
Congress stressed that language to eliminate discrimination as a bar-
rier to nonregulated cogeneration and small power production.' 73
171. For a collection of materials addressing the problem as experienced in the
telecommunications industry, see T. MORGAN, supra note 119, at 778-826.
The desire of utilities to enter the field of solar energy is particularly well docu-
mented. See generally Lawrence and Minan, The Competitive Aspects of Utility Par-
ticipation in Solar Development, 54 IND. L.J. 229 (1979); Lawrence & Minan, Solar
Energy and Public Utility Rate Regulation, 26 UCLA L. REv. 550 (1979); Sparrow,
Public Utility Involvement with Distributed Solar Systems, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 955 (1980).
Their participation in the distribution of solar devices, either by sale or lease, is seen
by regulators as presumptively invalid. The Residential Energy Conservation Utility
Program under the National Energy Conservation Planning Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8201-
8278 (1982), regulates the conduct of persons engaged in financing and constructing
conservation systems for residential structures of four or fewer units. See id The Act
also regulates utility companies engaging in sales, service, installation, and/or financ-
ing of such conservation devices. Id The utilities have an affirmative statutory duty
to prevent unfair trade practices that ultimately may result in decreased residential
participation in solar and other energy conservation methods. Id One commentator
suggests a common law duty as well. See generally Note, The Duty of a Public Utility
to Render Adequate Service, 62 COLUM. L. Rnv. 312 (1962).
Financing of solar installations by utilities is also a major issue. Seven states (Iowa,
Wisconsin, North Carolina, New York, Ohio, California, and Oregon) have enacted
either statutes or administrative regulations requiring utilities to provide such financ-
ing. See Colton, Mandatory Utility Financing of Conservation and Solar Measures, 3
SOLAR L. REP. 767, 768 (1982). A primary question is whether it is the utility stock-
holder or ratepayer who must shoulder the expenses of such financing. Penn-
sylvania's Public Utilities Commission ruled that the stockholder must pay.
Pennsylvania PUC v. Equitable Gas Co., 21 P.U.R. 4th 34 (Pa. P.U.C. 1977). One
commentator foresees a beneficial trend, and envisions the utility of the future as a
provider of full energy services rather than of simply a particular type of fuel. See
Colton, supra, at 768.
172. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
173. See H. CONF. REP. 95-1750, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7797, 7832.
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New law, however, can change long standing attitudes only with
time.
The structure of QCF industry provides ample opportunity for
utilities to discriminate in favor of facilities in which they hold an
interest. 74 The greater the interest, the greater the incentive for dis-
crimination. First, a utility may seek unlawfully to refuse intercon-
nection with a QCF by alleging falsely that the facility is an unsafe
burden on the utility grid. The QCF will have to resort to legal
processes 175 in order to contest that allegation, regardless of its mer-
its. The QCF will realize a financial loss resulting from lost generat-
ing revenues as well as expensive legal fees. The possibility of such
expenses serves as a chilling effect on the QCF market entrant.
Perhaps the greatest potential threat from the one hundred percent
rule is the market power that utilities hold. Because they enjoy an
officially sanctioned monopoly in an area of continuous consumer
need, 176 the utilities have great economic power notwithstanding
their current financial difficulties. Coupling that power with utility
technical expertise results in the potential for monopoly leverage in
the QCF marketplace. For example, utilities can construct and oper-
ate QCFs at a financial loss for considerable periods of time by using
the regulated portion of their business to provide operating funds. 177
174. See generally N. DEAN, supra note 17, at 154-96.
175. Judicial review enforcement of§ 210 is provided for in 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(g)
(1982). Any person may bring an action against a state public utility commission, a
utility, or a QCF to enforce any provision of§ 210. Id Congress granted the FERC
the power to enforce § 210 in § 824a-3(h). If the Commission does not bring an en-
forcement action within 60 days, the aggrieved party may do so himself. Id § 824a-
3(h)(B).
176. See supra note 40 for a definition of natural monopolies. See generally 2 E.
KINTNER, 2 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS § 12.14 (1980); Posner, Natural Monopoly
and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969); Turner, The Scope ofAntitrust and
Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1969).
Demand elasticity refers to how variations in price affect demand for a market
commodity. The more a given price change effects market demand, the greater is the
elasticity of demand. Thus, if a 5C change in the price of a widget costing 50¢ alters
demand up or down by 40%, then the widget market is highly sensitive to price; it is
highly price elastic. If the price of gadget may rise or fall substantially with no signifi-
cant corresponding demand change, then price is inelastic. Generally, commodities
with no market substitutes are relatively price inelastic, particularly if the commodity
is a necessity of life. See generally T. MORGAN, supra note 119, at 5-23.
177. This transaction borders on the fraudulent, and the utility would be at risk of
liability and prosecution. In the "fishbowl" of public utility ratemaking, such an ac-
tion by a utility is unlikely.
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Only the utilities' largest QCF competitors will be able to compete.
Of these competitors, many would abandon self-generation rather
than maintain continued losses in a subsidiary investment.'
Such utility activities will most likely violate antitrust laws.' 79 An-
titrust suits, however, are expensive to litigate and difficult to win.' 80
178. Standard Oil Company used this technique with great effectiveness in the
late nineteenth century. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911). See
also Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (use of market
strength in California to monopolize market in Utah).
Since PURPA requires utilities to purchase a QCF's output, and specifies purchase
rates, much of a utility's market power would not affect competitors. Larger QCFs
may choose to contract individually with the utility, and rely on their larger size and
greater reliability to realize a higher market price than PUC-determined market cost.
It is this contract-power market where utility market leverage may harm
cogeneration.
179. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits "monopolization." 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1982).
One violation uses predatory pricing, supra note 178, as a tool in the use of monop-
oly strength in one market to gain monopoly strength in another. The United States
Supreme Court addressed specifically the issue of market leverage in United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948). In that case, the Court found that a motion picture
theatre owner could not use his monopoly of theatres in one town to gain a competi-
tive advantage in towns in which he had no monopoly. Id at 101-10. The defendant
had lumped together towns in which he had a monopoly and towns in which he did
not when booking firms with distributors. To gain favor in the monopoly towns, the
distributor granted special advantages in the non-monopoly towns to the owner. In
the Court's opinion, "If monopoly power can be used to beget monopoly, [§ 2 of the
Sherman] Act becomes a feeble instrument indeed." Id at 108.
In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980), a number of photographic products companies sued
Kodak for § 2 violations, claiming that Kodak sought to exercise its monopoly power
in photographic film to gain a monopoly in the camera manufacturing industry. The
court reversed a judgment against Kodak, holding that simply introducing a new film
in a format adaptable only to its new camera was not exercising monopoly leverage,
because the plaintiff itself could manufacture a camera which could receive the new
film. In dictum, however, the court noted: "The use of monopoly power attained in
one market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation of § 2, even if
there has not been an attempt to monopolize the second market. It is the use of
economic power that creates the liability." Id at 276. As applied to utilities and
QCFs, Grifith and Berkey Photo will prohibit utilities from exercising their monopoly
power in their regulated sector to better compete in the unregulated sector.
Privately-owned publicly regulated utilities are within the jurisdiction of the federal
antitrust laws notwithstanding their governmental associations. City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 394-408 (1978).
180. See Posner, .4 Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. OF L. AND
ECON. 365 (1970). Posner's study shows that in the years between 1945 and 1964,
antitrust cases brought by the Department of Justice lasted an average of 35 months.
Litigated cases averaged 50 months, and cases heard by the Supreme Court averaged
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Consequently, the Department of Justice will not bring a public en-
forcement action in every instance of an alleged violation.
B. Self-Dealing
Any time that a parent company and subsidiary engage in mutual
transactions a danger exists that the parent company will extract ex-
cessively high profits from the subsidiary.' The problem is particu-
larly serious when the parent is a regulated monopoly utility and the
high profits are paid for by captive ratepayers. It arises frequently in
the context of telephone utility transactions with its mother company.
When American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) owned large
portions of local telephone operating companies, 182 dealings between
those companies and AT&T often precipitated litigation by disgrun-
65 months. See id at 377. While no firm data exists on the duration of private anti-
trust actions, enough information exists to determine that plaintiffs rarely prevail on
the merits. Of 221 private antitrust suits reaching final disposition in 1969, only eight
resulted in ajudgment for the plaintiff. In 1966, of approximately 1150 cases, only 17
found the plaintiff victorious. Id at 383. Assuming that the complainant's counsel is
operating on a contingency fee, that attorney may face four years of work with a slim
chance of success. Counsel may seek to avoid all but the most clear-cut Sherman Act
violations. The chilling effect is obvious if the client must pay expenses.
181. Dealings between a parent company and a subsidiary are subject to the anti-
trust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). A taxicab
manufacturer bought several large cab companies and established purchase contracts
between manufacturing and operating subsidiaries. The Court stated:
The test of illegality under the Act is the presence or absence of an unreasonable
restraint on interstate commerce. Such a restraint may result as readily from a
conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common owner-
ship as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise independent. . . .The
corporate interrelationships of the conspirators, in other words, are not determi-
native of the applicability of the Sherman Act. That statute is aimed at substance
rather than form.
Id at 227.
See also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (Ameri-
can corporation and foreign subsidiary engaged in conspiracy to divide world bearing
market). See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 325-29
(1977).
Self-dealing problems sometimes arise when a subsidiary company is owned in part
by a parent corporation, and in part by a minority shareholder. If the parent does not
conduct transactions with the subsidiary fairly, shareholders may bring derivative
suits for damages to the corporation. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717 (Del. 1971) (if parent corporation disregards binding contract with subsidiary,
subsidiary has a cause of action for breach of contract).
182. In 1982, the Department of Justice and American Telephone & Telegraph
reached a consent decree by which AT&T would divest itself of local operating com-
pany ownership. In the telephone industry, at least, the traditional self-dealing prob-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/10
PURPA QUALIFYING COGENERATORS
tied ratepayers and utility commissions. 183 Similar problems arise
when electric utilities own coal mines that supply the requirements of
the parent company.18
4
Identical problems emerge when an electric utility is the sole share-
holder in a QCF. If the parent and subsidiary have a contractual
buy-sell arrangement,' 85 it is reasonable to imagine that the bargain-
ing positions taken by the parties were diametrically opposed to each
other. Furthermore, it may be difficult to prove padded rates because
each QCF-utility agreement is unique.186
Utility-QCF self-dealing also presents the potential for "cream-
skimming." Because a utility will be able to put a new QCF into
either the regulated portion of its business or the unregulated portion,
the most costly units will go into the rate base, and the less costly
(and therefore more profitable) units will go to the subsidiary. A util-
ity choosing to install bottoming cycle cogenerators 87 operating off
industrial exhaust heat can choose the method more advantageous to
it, rather than to the public. Ratepayers will see this choice reflected
in their electric bills. 188
C. Rate and Investment Distortions
Extensive electric utility involvement in QCF ownership can affect
lem is now largely moot. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., and Am. Tel.
& Tel., 1982-2 Trade Cases 1 64,900 (Aug. 24, 1983).
183. See generally Note, Treatment of Affiliated Transactions in Rate Making:
Western Electric Company andthe BellSystem, 56 B.U.L. REv. 558 (1976). There are
two basic approaches in dealing with transactions between affiliates, one of which is a
regulated utility. The first approach adopts a "market price" standard by which the
profit realized by the supplying company is judged by other companies providing
similar products. This is the traditional approach taken by public utility commis-
sions. California has taken an alternative approach, adopted by several other states,
which assumes that the supplying company is a branch of the locally regulated utility.
The rate of return realized by the supplier may not be greater than that of the utility.
See 1 A. PRiEST, supra note 5, at 103.
184. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
185. FERC Rule 292.304(d) permits qualifying facilities to have the option of sell-
ing power to a utility "as available" or pursuant to a legally enforceable contract. 18
C.F.R. § 292.304(d) (1984). The contract sales price may be based either on the
avoided cost at the time the parties entered the contract or the avoided cost at the time
of the actual sale. Id §§ 294.304(d)(2)(i), (ii).
186. The problem is exacerbated with greater numbers of QCFs.
187. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 152.
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utility rates in both the short- and long-term. These distortions result
from the avoided cost basis of determining QCF purchase rates and
from the ability of the utilities to divert funds from regulated service
into non-regulated endeavors.
The avoided cost calculation of rates paid to QCFs for supplied
power requires that an electric utility pay the QCF the full cost of
that power, as if the utility had obtained it elsewhere, 89 either by
self-generation or by "wheeling."' 90 If the electric utility has its own
generating capacity, 191 it may be in a position to control avoided cost
by seeking the most expensive form of peak generation192 and per-
missible fuels when planning for new capacity, either in earnest or for
the purpose of avoided cost calculation. 193 When the higher priced
capacity enters the ratebase the electric utility will be able to engage
in a form of dipping. Revenues will increase: 1) As a result of higher
regulated income from the inflated ratebase;194 2) from the higher
costs to the regulated utility as a result of higher avoided cost pay-
ments;195 and 3) from the increased profitability of the QCF at the
expense of the regulated parent company. Once again, the ratepayers
will pay this difference.
Another distortion concerns the diversion of resources from the
regulated sector to the unregulated sector. Rather than putting
money into the ratebase and improving base facilities, electric utili-
ties may put their monetary resources into more profitable endeavors.
189. See supra note 68.
190. "Wheeling" is the transmission of power generated in one location to a dis-
tributor situated in another location.
191. Many utility companies own only the primary and secondary lines necessary
to provide power delivery. All power these firms sell must be obtained elsewhere.
192. Peak generation refers to those times when demand is at its highest. Because
these periods are intermittent (usually occurring on hot summer days when many
persons operate air conditioning equipment) it is more profitable to build small gener-
ators and run them at only these times than it is to build new baseload capacity to
handle new high peaks.
193. Although the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, supra note
143, prohibits construction of new generating capacity using natural gas or petroleum
as a primary energy source, 42 U.S.C. § 8311(1) (1982), exemptions are available on
the basis of need. See id § 8322. Utilities would have strong incentives to fight tena-
ciously for one of these exemptions.
194. FERC rule 292.302 requires large utilities to file cost data with the state util-
ity commission for the purpose of calculating avoided costs. Qualifying facilities that
submit a request must be provided with comparable data.
195. See supra note 152.
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The power produced by unregulated bottoming cogenerators would
be priced higher than power produced by conventional means. This
is so because the avoided cost rate would be high and because of the
higher cost of the equipment. The utility can realize greater capacity
for the same capital input if all long-term investments went into the
regulated sector of the business.
In summary, full QCF ownership by utilities will discourage indus-
trial and commercial participation in alternate energy production de-
spite benefits under section 210 of PURPA. Congressional intent is
to encourage utilization of waste heat from industrial processes gen-
erally, not from particular electric utility generation. 196 Even though
utility cogeneration will offset some industrial combustion by provid-
ing process steam through steam lines, 197 oversaturation of the QCF
market by the utilities will not advance the recovery of waste heat.
The industrialist will continue to buy power from the utility and soci-
ety's ultimate energy savings will suffer. PURPA section 210 will
have the effect of invigorating the electric utility industry.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
Neither the benefits nor the liabilities of full electric utility QCF
ownership suggest the superiority of one form over the other.
Although it appears that the current ownership rules have a deterring
effect on realization of cogeneration capacity, the regulatory frame-
work is still new' 98 and rash action may only upset the foundations
for potential future growth in other industries.
It is not certain that electric utilities will engage in unlawful and
unethical practices under a one hundred percent rule, but there have
been problems in the past with similarly regulated industries.'9 9 If
the FERC takes certain precautionary steps, however, the benefits of
a one hundred percent rule can be realized without the detriments.
The best way to measure the effectiveness of the one hundred per-
cent rule would be for state PUCs to limit total permitted utility QCF
capacity and to limit the size of a given QCF installation. This would
be done pursuant to FERC rules. The ownership requirements
should begin with the assumption that non-utility QCF ownership is
196. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
198. The final rules in many states are only three years old.
199. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
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the ideal, but that utilities should enter where they are able to pro-
mote cogeneration. PUCs should assess each utility service area in
order to determine the potential and actual QCF development. An
ideal level of QCF penetration will find industry realizing a substan-
tial percentage of capacity at all levels of organizational size. If real-
ized penetration is unsatisfactory, the PUC should permit the utility
to undertake a controlled entry into the market.
Initially, the utility should create an arm's length subsidiary with
separate offices, management, and accounting procedures. The sub-
sidiary should then be permitted to construct several nominally-sized
QCFs. The unit would operate as a normal QCF, but the subsidiary
would be under an affirmative obligation to cooperate with potential
cogenerators as to all aspects of plant operations. The utility QCF
would serve as a pilot program in order to familiarize the business
community in the utility's service areas with cogeneration operations.
When non-utility cogeneration begins to proliferate, PUCs should
permit additional utility QCF construction moderated by a percent-
age of the total QCF capacity on line. For example, a thirty to fifty
percent ceiling on total utility owner QCF capacity would eliminate
the potential for utility dominance in the field.
VII. CONCLUSION
The FERC rules promulgated under section 201 of PURPA limit
participation by electric utilities in QCF ownership to fifty percent of
equity, even though these rules may be contrary to congressional in-
tent. Their purpose is to limit the potential for electric utility anti-
trust violations, self-dealing, and rate and planning distortion. It is
not certain that these evils will not occur with less than full utility
QCF ownership. The benefits of cogeneration would be realized
more quickly if the federal government permitted limited full utility
participation. Utility success will encourage other types of industry
to engage in cogeneration more quickly than they might otherwise
have done. Finally, the troubled electric utility industry needs an in-
flux of new capital in order to regain stability. Entry into the non-
regulated electric power generation market could spark investor in-
terest and get the utilities back on their feet. Congress should amend
section 201 of PURPA to allow electric utilities to own one hundred
percent of QCF equity in an appropriate regulatory environment.
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